Beauty Before the Eyes of Others
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This paper pursues the philosophical significance of a relatively unexplored point of Platonic aesthetics: the social dimension of beauty. The social dimension of beauty resides in its conceptual connection to shame and honour. My historical claim is that this dimension is ethically significant for Plato to the extent that becoming virtuous presupposes a desire to appear and to be admired as beautiful. I argue that this social dimension – particularly its emphasis on beautification – illuminates important but often overlooked roles of beauty in contemporary ethical life and proves fruitful for reconsidering the scope and nature of aesthetic experience.

This is an essay in retrieval. By exploring a relatively unfamiliar aspect of the Platonic concept of beauty, I hope to make more familiar some aspects of our own. I shall emphasize the ethical significance of beautification. My discussion shall bring into focus two insights which Plato makes central but which contemporary theories tend to occlude. The first is that a concept of beauty is embedded in and acquired from concrete cultural practices. The second is that one desires on this basis to be admired as beautiful. For Plato these insights connect beauty conceptually to shame and honour, to salutary notions of appearing before others. I shall suggest that the complexities and problems of beautification require richer attention to the ways in which these connections figure in our lives. My argument shall therefore let beauty sound more clearly in its ethical and distinctively social registers. And with this I need to begin with an immediate warning.

Inquiries into the concept of beauty in Greek antiquity quickly find themselves in foreign territory. The ancient concept (to kalon, kallos) is not – and could not have been – centrally related to categories of art and nature, the fine arts and taste, or autonomous aesthetic experience that have inflected the concept of beauty since the eighteenth century. This observation has often been marshalled toward the conclusion that if ancient Greeks possessed a concept of beauty at all, it must be incongruent with or even less developed than its modern counterpart. Several philosophers and classical scholars have recently inverted the terms of this argument, however. Rather than presupposing the boundary lines now thought to demarcate beauty, these thinkers have appropriated ancient discussions to criticize what they regard as overly narrow or abstracted modern notions of beauty and the aesthetic. Others have relied on Platonic criticisms of poetry to show that aesthetic and ethical evaluation are contiguous. Still others have reinvigorated Plato’s view that beauty is the object of love, particularly as against disinterested judgment.¹ I would like to explore the connection for Plato between beauty and shame and honour to evoke the social dimension of beauty.

1.

I begin from a programmatic passage in Book 3 of the Republic. Here we find Plato acutely aware that material culture – buildings passed, clothes worn, prayers sung, music heard – imperceptibly and gradually mould character. Not only poets, Socrates states, but painters, architects, and all other

¹ Incongruence and underdevelopment: see notably Croce 1995, pp. 156-66 and Kristeller 1951, pp. 498-506, whose continued influence is felt in Kosman 2010. Halliwell 2002, pp. 6-13 excellently outlines the critical strategy and its need. Hanson 1998 provides an exemplary defence of a Platonic view that ethics and aesthetics are contiguous, Nehamas 2007 that beauty is the object of love; but see Murdoch 1970 for a stimulating, if idiosyncratic, attempt to unite Platonic erōs and Kantian disinterest.
craftsmen embody images of character in their crafts (Rep. 401b). His point is that all corners of a culture decisively impact the kind of person one admires and aspires to be, or can even imagine as a viable way of life. This horizon constitutes a foundational sense of what is beautiful (*kalon*) and ugly (*aisthron*), from which one’s attractions, aversions, beliefs, values, and self-image will grow. The aim of musical-poetic education is to direct this sensibility to what is *genuinely* beautiful:

…”we must seek out craftsmen who have a natural talent for capturing what is truly beautiful and graceful (*tên tou kalou te kai enshēmenos plusin*) so that our young, dwelling as it were in a healthy place, may be benefited from all over. Something of those beautiful works will strike their eyes and ears (*tōn kalōn ergōn … ti proshale*) and, like a breeze bringing health from good places, will bring them unwares (*lanthano*) right from childhood on to likeness, friendship, and concord with beautiful reason (*eis homoiotēta te kai philiar kai sumphōnian to kalō logō agōsa*).²

(Rep. 401cd)

Socrates assumes that one will recognize, be attracted to and emulate the beautiful character of a virtuous person if and only if surrounded by what is truly beautiful. Part of the reason why beauty should be privileged is that it makes virtue – more specifically, an ideal of a ‘graceful’ *kalos kagathos* – sensible and attractive. Beauty is particularly apt for structuring one’s most elemental perceptions, pleasures, and desires toward a good and flourishing human life. But this explanation, though correct, is limited. To invest interest in beauty in its relation to virtue and the good is to pass over what is distinctive about this concept and perhaps most illuminating for us: its social character.

The classical Greek concept of beauty (*to kalon, kallos*) is a thick, not a thin, evaluative concept. By this I mean that it fuses description and evaluation and, more significantly, that its content and force depend on its role within concrete social practices.³ One function of the concept is to mobilize admiration (and, by contrast, disgust), envy, and emulation, all of which in this conceptual scheme bring ethical evaluation under the rubric of shame and honour. This connection to shame and honour has been thought to take us too far from beauty indeed, either because we are now on ethical terrain or because we do not call deeds or deaths ‘beautiful’ so readily as Pericles would call them *kalon*. Most therefore designate the *kalon* as the *fine, noble, or admirable* – and *beautiful* only derivatively in erotic or ‘aesthetic contexts.’⁴ But we might instead consider the fact that Socrates moves from a clear concern over beautiful environs *without changing step* to the claim that if an older male lover does not consort with his beloved “for the sake of what is beautiful” (*tôn kalōn charin*), he will be reproached as “uncultured through music and poetry and inappreciative of beauty” (*amousias kai apeirokalias*, Rep. 403bc), for want of the acculturation Socrates was just discussing.⁵ We are uneasy claiming that the older male should act for the sake of the beautiful, and unsure about what this could mean. But that is the point. The point has little to do with pederasty and everything to do with the fact that we insist

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² All translations are my own. ‘Beautiful reason’ for *tō kalō logō* at Rep. 401d is meant to convey both a substantive conception of reason, on which one acquires rational capacities, and associations of *logos* with proportion and order. A difficulty here is that the phrase looks forward to *logon* and *tou logon* at 402a, neither of whose senses is obvious. Many take *tou logon* as the reason or explanation why something is beautiful and ugly. Even so, emphasis should rest on the notion that one ‘embraces’ reason as such if and only if already familiar with or akin to it (*di’ oikeiotēta malista*, 402a).

³ Here I follow Williams 1985, pp. 128-9, 141, 218 n7 and, before him, Geertz 1973, pp. 3-30.


⁵ Cf. the rare noun *apeirokalia* (lack of experience or appreciation of beauty) again at Rep. 405b: this aesthetically and ethically vulgar condition disposes one to a petty and shameful life exploiting legal loopholes.
on a border between the aesthetic and the ethical that Plato does not draw. That border is particularly problematic when we feel at home on one side but not the other, and so unclear how we might get across. What is needed is to recover a concept of beauty rich enough to support the kind of considerations that bind it to shame and honour.

What kinds of considerations are those? Primarily concerns over preserving self-image and status. We may come to this point by noticing that the principal target of the aesthetic education is what Plato calls spirit or the spirited element of the soul, _thumos_ or _to thumoeides_. The many powerful manifestations of spirit, such as anger, shame, pride, and competitive desire, organize around a sense of shame and honour. On account of spirit, adult human beings aim to stand out and to be admired as beautiful and not to be considered ugly and thus shameful. This they do first and foremost in terms of *shared* norms of beauty that circulate in a culture and that underlie their identities as members of that culture.⁶

I want ultimately to pose the question of what, philosophically, we might learn from this historical connection between beauty, shame, and honour. But I must first develop its contours and its significance for Plato’s ethical psychology, at least in the Republic. I shall suggest that the use of beauty to educate primarily spirit reflects that an ethical life requires identities that centrally involve self-presentation; and that this is ultimately so because virtue is a public affair. Beauty, on this picture, does not simply make virtue sensible and attractive. It is the currency of a fundamentally human activity to live in community and contest before the eyes of others.

2.

One passage of the Republic makes particularly vivid the conceptual tie between beauty and shame. Socrates tells the tale of Leontius - appropriately named ‘Lion-like’ - to introduce spirit as a third source of human motivation distinct from reason and appetite. Notice, please, the central theme of vision and visibility:

But I once heard a story, and I believe it, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the northern wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He desired to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned himself away (duscherainoi kai apotrepoi heauton). For some time, he struggled and covered his face (parakaluptoito), but finally, overpowered by the desire, with eyes pushed open wide he rushed toward the corpses and said, “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight! (emplēsthete tou kalou theamatos)”

Glaucon: I’ve heard that story myself. (Rep. 439e-440a)

Leontius is ashamed at wanting to gaze at the corpses, as suggested by his attempt to hide (parakaluptoito) and more clearly by his disgust with himself, or with his eyes. Scholars have by and large groped for a sexual explanation of his psychology, according to which Leontius feels shame at being titillated by the pallor of the corpses or by the prospect of necrophilia. More promising, I believe,⁶

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⁶ Spirit and love of honour: Rep. 545a, 548cd, 550b-551a, 553b, 554e-555a; anger, shame, and high-mindedness structured: 439e-440d, 549d, 550b, 560a, 563d; primary target of primary education: 376ab, 401e-402a, 410c-412a, 429d-430c. On this view, the _kalon_ is the formal object of spirit. This is to appropriate yet contest a tradition in which honour is eminently _kalon_ and spirit the seat of social emotions structured by honour-based institutions. This interpretation requires more defense than I can provide here; but cf. Renaut 2014, pp. 26-46, 182-97, 249-60, despite his neglect of the _kalon_ in this connection.
is that Leontius savors the morbid thrill of the public execution, as one might a car crash, but finds it indecent to linger over the sight. The corpses, after all, are exposed for people to notice, but only to notice, what happens to the worst offenders in imperial Athens.7

The precise details of his motivational conflict need not detain us, however. What merits our attention is the complex role that beauty plays in the mechanisms of shame, focused in Leontius’ bitterly ironic and indeed very public cry that his eyes take their “fill of the beautiful sight.” There are two inseparable aspects of his shame. The first faces Leontius himself. Leontius feels he has done something beneath himself. His ironic use of kalon labels not just the corpses but his desire to gaze at them ugly. This is to say that his shame discloses values that delimit the boundaries of his practical identity – what he can and cannot live with – and his shame motivates him, though ineffectually, to live up to that self-image.

The concept of beauty is central to these mechanisms. It introduces discriminations among pleasures. Beauty is pleasurable but also normative. It excludes certain pleasures as not to be pursued, particularly those one has been brought up to distaste as ugly. But such discriminations serve primarily to ennoble, to elevate. A beautiful self-image in shame attracts one toward those aspects of oneself with which one is identified or wants to identify. If properly reared in beauty, Socrates hopes, an ennobling self-image in shame can lead one closer toward developing a fully human nature, whatever that may be.

The self-directed aspect of shame reinforces a point that Bernard Williams argued with characteristic incisiveness in Shame and Necessity, that the Greek understanding of shame was too psychologically complex and ethically rich to be considered “unacceptably heteronomous, crudely dependent on public opinion” (Williams 1993, p. 97). Williams wanted to reject the view, which remains prevalent in classical scholarship as in cultural attitudes, that shame depends on fear of ‘external’ sanctions such as the reproach of witnesses, and so is less ethically mature than guilt, supposed to rely on an ‘internal’ and individual conscience.8 Williams objected that the charge that shame is heteronomous presupposes a problematic notion of autonomy that ignores the way in which our identities are contingently formed by and necessarily situated in concrete social formations. Chiefly relevant for us is that the nature of spirit registers this point. This is not only because spirit is particularly sensitive to cultural upbringing but also, and more significantly, because its characteristic expressions of shame and honour cannot be adequately described in terms and at the level of individual psychology. These attitudes disclose a self-image, but the relevant conception of the self essentially refers to how one stands in relation to others.

Plato ensures the point is not lost. For the story of Leontius is about the eyes of others as much as his own. Notice first that when he rebukes his eyes, the executioner would have been in mind and perhaps literally in view. It does not matter whether Leontius actually notices the executioner or anyone else for that matter. As Williams duly emphasized, shame does not essentially involve fear of being seen by actual witnesses. It suffices to imagine how one would seem to someone, often someone whom one respects, for just the reason that one shares or aspires to share her standards of evaluation. The imagined other could even be a more abstracted ethical reference point or role model, figured

7 Cf. Rep. 605a, 606ab for a link between appetite and theatrical spectacle. My interpretation is closest to Ferrari 2007, p. 181, who adapts the excellent insight of Allen 2000, pp. 245-46, 251-52 into the historical legal context. The traditional interpretation depends on sexual desire being the best fit among paradigmatic appetites, but a paradigmatic appetite is not compulsory.
8 This view was expressed with particular intensity in classical scholarship by Adkins 1960. Adkins followed E.R. Dodds in taking the importance of shame at Athens to signal an early stage of ethical development, with Plato and Aristotle as intermediate figures in the ‘discovery’ of specifically moral notions of autonomy, responsibility and duty centred on the concept of the will.
perhaps – to take some choice examples from the Republic – as a mythic hero or god, the graceful kalos kagathos embodied in the cultural imagination, or, like the executioner, the instrument of Law. But what is absolutely critical to the phenomenology of shame according to Williams is that the other in shame must be genuinely other, and that means somebody who is “not just a screen for one’s own ethical ideas but is the locus of some genuine social expectations” (Williams 1993, p. 98).

These psychological complexities, I propose, help us understand why Leontius cries out publicly, and “in the language of beauty. Leontius is concerned with how he appears to some real or imagined others. Thus he humiliates himself by his outburst. He is in effect trying to save face by declaring, through his ironic use of kalon, that he knows what he is doing is shameful. More than that, the concept of beauty figures crucially because its outward vector as appearance captures the outward-facing aspect of his shame. This element of publicity assumes greater significance when we note, finally, that Plato has carefully framed the entire episode by the eyes and ears of others. He stresses at the start that Socrates heard the story from somewhere, at the end that Glauccon had heard it too. Whether Leontius himself, the executioner, or someone else spread the tale (as we now do further: poor Leontius), this framing device trains our gazes onto the way in which self-images are informed by and presented to the evaluations of others.

This last insight brings home the full force of the conceptual connection between beauty and shame. So tight is this connection that Sophocles’ Ajax, to cite an example of Williams’, could express his shame at the thought of returning home stripped of glory – naked, in his words (gumnos, Aj. 464) – by proclaiming, “the noble man must either live kalós or die kalós”; we might now venture to translate, ‘live beautifully or die beautifully’ (all’ è kalós zên è kalós tetmēkenai ton eugenē chrē, 479-80). The words of Ajax remind us that Leontius’s fear of disgrace takes its bearing from an honour-based aspiration to perform beautiful deeds. To perform beautiful deeds means, in this context, to be and to seen to be outstanding. These are not two separate motivations but one, complexly structured. Recent interpretations are inclined, particularly by modern moral ideas of shame and the self, to clinically prise apart the self- and other-directed aspects of shame or honour. But if we do this, we risk obscuring a profound reason why these motivations, and so why beauty, should hold their precise significance for Plato – a profound reason, I believe, also for us but which we need to make more familiar to ourselves.

A firm sense of shame and honour is vital to becoming virtuous for Plato. I have already intimated one reason for this, that its absence results in an indiscriminate pursuit of any and all pleasure. While this negative reason has become familiar to scholars of Plato, few attend to a more positive and more fundamental reason behind it in the conceptual background. Following but also contesting a long tradition reaching back to Homeric glory, Plato assumes that a fully human life must be lived in concert with others and before their eyes. The ethical importance of beauty, shame and honour thus redounds to a public conception of virtue. Indeed, classical descriptions of virtue alight on its beauty to stress how virtue shines forth, is manifest or displayed to an audience struck with delight, as Phaedrus does for example when he praises Alcestis for sacrificing her life for her husband’s, Admetus:

her deed was judged so beautifully done (to ergon… kalon edoxen ergasatbai) not only by mortals but even by the gods that, although the gods have given the prize of sending the soul back up

9 This paragraph draws also from Williams 1993, pp. 81-4.
10 Here I develop a suggestion of Burnyeat 2006, p. 11, though I disagree that Leontius is presented as being seen opening his eyes wide. It suffices to associate wide eyes with shamelessness, as does Galeottus Martius, for example, in his 1490 De homine, a.iii: “if the white of the eye is widely extended and visible all round, this shows shamelessness.” (Quoted in Baxandall 1988, p. 58)
from Hades to but a select few of the many who do very beautiful things, they sent her soul
because they were delighted (αγαθήτες) by her deed.

(Symp. 179cd)

This framework is thoroughly conventional, and that is the point; Plato’s radical vision, after all, can
only see so far. The idea in this passage, sounded more loudly in funeral oration, is that virtue is in
some sense incomplete if there are few or no eyes to see it. The salient point is not so much that all
should ideally see, and be educated to have eyes to see, the “most beautiful sight”, as Glaucon calls it,
of a virtuous person (Rep. 402d). Nor that spirited bonds of shame and honour create the social space
in which beautiful deeds are to make their appearance. It is that, if virtue is a public affair, one should
be concerned to some degree with the regard of others, rather than unconcerned or positively not
concerned with it. That is a job of spirit.

3.

It may seem there should be greater distance between the idea that virtue should be seen and the idea,
altogether less savory to the moralist, that a virtuous person should care whether her virtue is seen.
The thought owes its urgency to a modern private conception of virtue. Some variants of this
conception treat the social as a realm of appearances in opposition to reality, on the one hand, and to
an interiorized and moralized conception of the self, on the other. It bears repeating that this
framework does not belong to Plato. His lines between appearance and being are drawn in rather
different places, and not in dichotomy. This means, in turn, that Plato admits a less moralistic, more
nuanced, ethically richer notion of appearing before others.11 Frank Chapman Sharp hit upon this crucial
difference between ancient Greek and modern ethical tendencies of thought when he lamented in
1893 that “the ability to gaze upon our own superior moral excellencies with all the calm self-
complacency with which a Beau Brummel might contemplate the beauties of his attire in the glass,
this is gone, and we instinctively shrink back at the very idea of making an attempt in this direction...”
Our ruling principle, Sharp continues, is now “Above all, no posing – not even to one’s self!” (Sharp
1893, p. 99).

I shall not pursue the question of whether we should want to inject into our contemporary climates some of the (idealized and misrepresented) grandeur and ease that Sharpe found in antiquity.
I suspect we do not, and should not. I would like instead to consider how the strand of Platonic
thought we have been explicating might illuminate aspects of beauty which are virtually unremarked
in recent aesthetic and ethical thinking, even by those who rightly situate beauty beyond art and within
wider currents of our ethical and political lives. This neglect is unfortunate but understandable. There
is often a gap between what we think about beauty – how it figures in our experience – and what we
think we think about beauty – how it figures or is disfigured in reflection, philosophical or otherwise.12

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11 Plato could not have made, or not made decisive, the same set of distinctions that Kierkegaard, for example,
was at pains to make when he asked in his Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, “What is it to be more ashamed
before others than before oneself but to be more ashamed of seeming than of being?” (Kierkegaard 1993, p.
53). Plato does not have, ultimately, the relevant distinction between inner and outer. There is in this area a
difficult question to what extent Plato thinks the ‘other’ in shame or honour should become identified with
one’s own reason and so lose its tether to social reality. I would suggest the agonism which circumscribes a
philosophic life (cf. esp. Rep. 403e, 608bc) tells against a strongly affirmative answer, contra, e.g., Williams 1993,
pp. 98-100, 159-63. The model of an ‘objective-participant’ self in Gill 1996 is also relevant.
12 This image owes to Williams 1993, pp. 7, 91.
Plato can throw some useful light on this gap. Perhaps nowhere more so than on the significances of *beautification*, arts of making and enhancing beautiful appearance.

We began from a point about the beautification of a culture. This concern we preserve, happily (but not always) in more democratic forms than Socrates envisions, and in a variety of ways. We enjoy public parks and protect green spaces; create street murals and consider architectural design; congregate and divide through monuments, memorials, and anthems; consume and create worlds of fashion, food, and cultural media. I have emphasized how natural it was for Plato, and how much more so for him than us, to develop from this cultural point a line of thought about the beautification of oneself. Indeed, it betrays a very deep prejudice that I am tempted to qualify immediately that I do not have in mind cosmetics but rather beautiful and virtuous action. It would also entirely miss the point, betraying a simplistic interpretation. For the social dimension of beauty for Plato is oriented from his insight that the concepts of beauty and ugliness which inform self-images and aspirations are rooted in everyday practices of beautification. These are practices of cosmetics and costume, learned from images in movies and magazines with titles such as *Self, Essence*, and of course, *Beauty*. We tend to distrust this arena – what Arthur Danto termed the Third Realm of aesthetics between Art and Nature – as artifice, vanity, or worse (Danto 2003, pp. 61-80). Distrust is surely warranted. There is much need to combat misogynistic, heteronormative, and otherwise debilitating and insulting norms of beauty. Much need to reverse the debilitating sense of shame that too often they produce; and to the extent that beauty and shame tend to be connected at all, it is most likely with these harms and unjust structures in mind. It is worth noting that Plato, too, was deeply concerned about prevailing (if quite different) norms of beauty at Athens - the *Republic*, especially Books II and III arguably attempt to undermine their hold – if only to remark two general but, I believe, instructive aspects of this sort of challenge.

Plato’s attention to the social rootedness – or what I earlier called the ‘thickness’ – of the concept of beauty means that he sees quite clearly the *problems* imposed by beauty, but also the important fact that viable *solutions* can come only from within live currents of thought and feeling. What is needed is immanent critique. This point is too quickly forgotten by thinkers who put considerable stock in the emancipatory potential of beauty without paying, in rich enough coin, homage to the way in which the concept receives its shape and force from concrete, contested practices. Kathleen Higgins, for example, admirably notes that aspiring toward “a more beautiful future” is constrained by “dynamics of power, played out in the realms of art, aesthetic marketing and human interaction.” Yet her attempt to distinguish neatly and rescue this aspiration from kitsch and glamour fails to consider, on the one hand, that dynamics of power are *not external* to the concept of beauty, as Pierre Bourdieu and others have emphasized, and on the other hand, that sexualized advertisements, make-up counters, and the rest themselves proffer a conception of beauty which promises “well-being and integrity” (Higgins 2000, p. 107). It is just that what constitutes beauty, well-being, integrity, a good life, and so forth are constantly contested, indeed in and through these sorts of media, among other institutions. (Dove’s famous ‘Real Beauty’ campaign, and criticisms of it, affords one recent example of such conceptual movements.)

A second consideration to remark is that Plato’s concern does not arise, as I believe ours sometimes does, from a general prejudice against the heteronomy of appearing before others, a prejudice which I have suggested goes hand in conceptual hand with moralized views of shame, of the self, and of private virtue. Plato rather takes to heart an insight that Danto found in even diminished forms of beautification, that “we look into the mirror not merely to see how we look, but how we expect others to see us, and, unless amazingly self-confident, we attempt to modulate our appearances in order that others shall see us as we hope to be seen” (pp. 69-70). If the mirror was for Sharpe a site of calm self-complacency, Plato and Danto – and all of us perhaps – know it to be far more fraught. One reason it should be so is that we negotiate how we appear also in the context of
certain expectations of authenticity and autonomy; these ideas are ‘ours’, too, even when we reject them. But if anything, this serves to remind us not to distort the complex character of our ethical lives by reducing the significance of beauty in socialized modes of self-presentation.13

Plato may be the first but is hardly alone in relating beauty to sociality. This relation was dear, of course, in the British sentimentalist (for example, Hutcheson and Hume), German idealist (Kant, Schiller), and French critical traditions (Rousseau, Voltaire), all broadly engaging beauty in an Enlightenment project to cultivate taste and the communication of sensibility. Yet the above two considerations register what is distinctive of this dimension of beauty in Plato, in ways that provide grounds for moving beyond – or retreating back from – dominant models of aesthetic experience inherited from these eighteenth-century thinkers. In the eighteenth-century models, the sociality of beauty is often both a terminus and means, but not a starting point. The concern is often to make private sensation and taste communicable in the first place, and beauty is considered to foster this particularly well; here enters the notion of intersubjective validity in Kant. This project does not begin, as does Plato, from a concept of beauty already socially transacted.14

This difference in the meaning and role of sociality owes to the familiar idea that the early modern psychology of subject and object is (largely) inapplicable to antiquity; whence different philosophical problems, solutions, and points of salience. I have, in effect, been emphasizing a consequence that this has in turn for the structure of aesthetic experience. As we have seen, Plato does not privilege the standpoint of a spectator, as has been customary in modern aesthetic theory. He concentrates equally on the agential standpoint from which one aims to perform beautiful deeds. Beauty in this motivational role is not primarily or exclusively a property of an object. It belongs crucially to a subject, if I may use that term, appearing to other subjects. This difference in the logic of beauty, so to speak, is a function of beginning from a concept of beauty sufficiently thick to accommodate ways of adopting, adapting, transgressing, or contesting prevailing norms of beautiful appearance. It is for this reason that these motivations involve the real or imagined perspective of another. Putting these two points together – the social situation of beauty and its psychological dynamics in concerns over self-presentation - may prove fruitful if we wish to reconsider, as some have recently urged, the nature and scope of aesthetic experience. But much more than that, we may heed these points in order to attune ourselves better to the myriad ways we live under the sign of beauty – before the eyes of others.

References


13 This is to assume, somewhat dogmatically, that an ethical psychology should hope to align what we might call, in an unhappy phrase, ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ self-conceptions so far as possible. Not only should philosophical ethics and aesthetics be directed by and to ethical and aesthetic practices. Unreasonable ethical ideas may be counter-productive, giving rise to injurious feelings of guilt, for example, although there is a balance to be struck here between being realistic and aspirational, or between good and bad forms of being ‘unreasonable.’ (Platonic reason, remember, also madly aspires to impossible ends!)


