

Outline Syllabus for Seminar G9658 on Subjects of Consciousness (Advanced Topics in the Philosophy of Mind)

The Seminar will meet on Fridays 11.00am -12.50pm (location to be announced).

This Seminar is open both to those taking it for credit, and to anyone else who wishes to attend. For those taking it for credit, the requirement will be to write one paper on some topic, approved after discussion with the Instructor, connected with the topics of the Seminar.

Topics to be covered include, but will not necessarily be restricted to, the following, with the background reading specified:

1. Introductory Remarks and Overview

2. Primitive Self-Representation

G. Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: OUP, 1982), Chapter on Self-Identification

D. Kahneman, A. Treisman and B. Gibbs, 'The reviewing of object files: object-specific integration of information', *Cognitive Psychology* 24 (1992) 175-219

Z. Pylyshyn, *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007)

Further Reading:

T. Bayne, 'Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness', *The Monist* 87 (2004) 219-36

R. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1994), Chapter 8, section V.2

C. Peacocke, *Truly Understood* (Oxford: OUP, 2008), Chapter 3

J-P. Sartre, 'Conscience de Soi et Connaissance de Soi', repr. in **La Transcendance de l'Ego et autres textes phenomenologiques** ed. V. de Coorebyter (Paris: Vrin, 2003)

3. A Positive Conception of Subjects

T. Bayne and D. Chalmers, 'What is the Unity of Consciousness?' in *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation* ed. A. Cleeremans (Oxford: OUP 2003)

K. Fine, 'The Logic of Essence', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 24 (1995) 241-273

G. Frege, 'Thoughts', in *Logical Investigations* tr. P. Geach and R. Stoothof (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977)

D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* Book I, part iv, section 6

S. Hurley, 'Unity and Objectivity', in *Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind* Proceedings of the British Academy Volume 83 (Oxford: OUP, 1994)

I. Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, A 364 footnote, at p. 423 in the translation of P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998)

T. Nagel, 'What is it like to be a bat?', *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974) 435-50

G.E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', repr. in *G. E. Moore: Selected Writings* ed. T. Baldwin (London: Routledge, 1993)

F. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals* First Essay, section 13

D. Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: OUP, 1987), section on the Subject of Experience

L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 5.632-5.641

4. Comparisons: Contemporary Differences, Historical Affinities

D. Dennett, 'Where Am I?' in his *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology* (Vermont: Bradford Books, 1987)

D. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), Chapter 13.

J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Book II Chapter XXVII

T. Parsons, 'A Prolegmenon to Meinongian Semantics', *Journal of Philosophy* 71 (1974) 561-80.

P. Snowdon, 'Persons and Personal Identity', in *Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value* ed. S. Lovibond and S. Williams (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966)

5. *The First Person and its Nonconceptual Parent*

C. Peacocke, 'Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation', *Synthese* 49 (1981) 283-94.

C. Peacocke, *The Realm of Reason* (Oxford: OUP, 2004), sections on the rationality of transitions

J. Perry, 'The Self, Self-Knowledge, and Self-Notions', in his *Identity, Personal Identity and the Self* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002)

S. Rödl, *Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007), esp. Chs. 1 and 2.

6. *Can the De Se be Explained in Other Terms?*

J. Perry, 'The Self, Self-Knowledge and Self-Notions' and 'The Sense of Identity', in his *Identity, Personal Identity and the Self* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).

F. Recanati, contribution to issue 'Le moi, le soi, the self', ed. B. Longuenesse, issue 4 (2010) of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*

F. Recanati, 'De re and de se', *dialectica* 63 (2009) 249-269

R. Stalnaker, Ch. 3 'Locating Ourselves in the World', in his *Our Knowledge of the Internal World* (Oxford: OUP, 2008)

Further Reading:

C. Peacocke, 'Explaining the A Priori: The Program of Moderate Rationalism', in *New Essays on the A Priori* ed. P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (Oxford: OUP, 2000)

7. *Descartes Defended*

G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The First Person' in *Mind and Language: The Wolfson College Lectures 1974* ed. S. Guttenplan (Oxford: OUP, 1975).

R. Descartes, *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations*, especially Meditation Two and Second Set of Replies

K. Fine, 'Tense and Reality', version in his *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: OUP, 2005), esp. section on 'First Personalism'.

G. Lichtenberg, *Schriften und Briefe*, Vol. II (Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971), 412, §76.

C. Peacocke, *Being Known* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), Ch. 4 on Metaphysical Necessity.

A. Prior, *Papers on Time and Tense: New Edition* ed. P. Hasle, P. Øhrstrøm, T. Braüner, J. Copeland (Oxford: OUP, 2003), section on 'Egocentric Logic'.

B. Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), Chapter 3, 'Cogito and Sum'.

8. *Two Paralogisms: A Positive Alternative*

I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, chapter 'The Paralogisms of Pure Reason'

D. Parfit, *Reason and Persons* op. cit., passages on psychological continuity and awareness of identity over time.

Further Reading:

K. Ameriks, *Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Second Edition* (Oxford: OUP, 2000)

9. *Strawson's Neo-Kantian Conception*

P. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen, 1966), esp. pp. 97-112.

Further Reading:

C. Peacocke, *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations* (Oxford: OUP, 1983) esp. Ch 1.

P. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay on Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1959), esp. chapter 'Sounds'

10. Perspectival Self-Consciousness

J. Bermudez, *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998)

G. Gallup, "Chimpanzees: self-recognition", *Science* 167 (1970) 86-87

G. Gallup, *Self-recognition in chimpanzees and man: A developmental and comparative perspective* (New York: Plenum Press, 1979)

M. Iacoboni, *Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2008)

S. Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death* tr. E. and H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), esp. sections on self-consciousness

D. Reiss, L. Marino, 'Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A case of cognitive convergence' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* May 8, 2001, Vol 98 no 10, 5937-5942

J-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* tr. H. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), esp. Part III, Chapter One, Section IV 'The Look'

S. Shoemaker, 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness' repr. in his collection *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)

S. Shoemaker, 'Embodiment and Behavior', repr. in his *Identity, Cause and Mind*

11. Reflective Self-Consciousness

D. Armstrong, contribution to *Consciousness and Causality* by D. Armstrong and N. Malcolm (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984)

C. Peacocke, "Relation-Based Thought, Objectivity, and Disagreement" *dialectica* 64 (2010) 35-56

C. Peacocke, *Truly Understood* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), Ch. 7.

J-P. Sartre, "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi", repr. in the collection under the title *La Transcendance de l'Ego* ed. V. de Coorebyter (Paris: Vrin, 2003)

J-P. Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* tr. A. Brown (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), with an introduction by S. Richmond

S. Shoemaker, *The First Person Perspective and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Royce Lectures therein

B. Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), passages on the 'absolute conception'

12. A Response to Gopnik and Theory-Theory Conceptions

A. Gopnik, 'How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality' *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16 (1993) 1-14

13. Interpersonal Self-Consciousness

U. Neisser, 'Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge' *Philosophical Psychology* 1 (1988) 35-59, esp. section titled "The Interpersonal Self"

C. Peacocke, "Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge", in *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds* ed. N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, J. Roessler (Oxford: OUP, 2005)

Further Reading:

J. Barwise, 'Three Views of Common Knowledge', in M. Vardi (ed.), *Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge* (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1988)

J. Perner, U. Frith, A. Leslie, S. Leekam, 'Exploration of the autistic child's theory of mind: knowledge, belief and communication' *Child Development* 60 (1989) 689-700

S. Schiffer, *Meaning* (Oxford: OUP, 1988)