Reference and Naturalism

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I

The accumulating orthodoxy surrounding holism in the last several decades of philosophy had made it seem a natural and inescapable way of thinking about meaning and intentionality. But in the last few years it has come under attack from two very different directions. Despite some overlap in argument, the critiques of holism due to Michael Dummett and Jerry Fodor have their sources in radically divergent philosophical doctrines. Dummett sees a denial of holism as being of a piece with a roughly verificational doctrine of linguistic meaning, a verificationalism that allows us to see languages as conservative extensions of proper fragments of themselves, thereby, in one sense, as essentially non-holistic.1 Fodor, on the other hand, is driven by a picture of meaning and intentional content which is exclusively denotational, and he sees holism as the product of a departure from this denotational path in ways that thwart the naturalistic reduction of meaning and intentionality, and spoil the prospects of a genuinely scientific study of them.

This paper will focus entirely on Fodor,2 and even in this limited focus it will have a modest agenda. It will not try and show why holism is harmless and unthreatening, nor will it defend the many different holists, whose arguments and conclusions Fodor has attacked. They are, by all appearances, busy defending themselves. It will not even try and give a head-on and explicit argument in favour of holism, but instead proceed with more indirection. It will pose to Fodor the challenge: Let's see how well you get along without holism". If it turns out that Fodor does not get along very well, then we may assume that something like an argument for holism is
lodged in the reasons for thinking so. This strategy will require one to look at his own positive alternative to holism, and see whether it is a viable doctrine about meaning and intentionality.

His alternative doctrine is formulated in two books prior to his recent book attacking the subject of holism, co-authored with Ernest Lepore.iii In the latter, he and Lepore deny that they are presupposing his positive alternative view in their arguments against various holists. They merely claim to show that holism does not hold up on scrutiny. But, as I will argue later, at a crucial point they presuppose Fodor's very specific non-holistic doctrine in their actual scrutiny.

Fodor sees holism as the inexorably degenerate end of a doctrine about meaning and belief, which he calls 'anatomism'. Anatomism is opposed to atomism, which he favours. Atomism has it that it is possible for a subject to have only one belief-content or meaning. Anatomism denies this; and holism carries the denial to extremity by claiming that any particular belief-content depends on the content of most or all other beliefs of a subject. Moreover holism is inevitable once one departs from atomism to anatomism.iv

He thinks it is an important truth about intentionality that atomism holds, and says that philosophers have only taken to denying atomism relatively recently, and praises earlier philosophers such as Locke and Hume, despite their bad specific atomistic theories of meaning and belief, for at least allowing that atomism be true.

How is atomism possible? There are presumably many answers to this question. Fodor's answer -- and here he departs from Locke and Hume -- is that it is possible because meaning is to be understood wholly in terms of denotation. His account of denotation differs from other recent accounts such as Kripke's because it does not depend on causal connections with remote originary or baptismal events. Rather causality comes in a refinement of the information-theoretic story owing to Dretske and Stampe.v He stresses that the causal links one looks to are covariances between tokens of mental representations and properties in the external environment.

His question is: What does the fact that a certain mental representation means horse, say, consist in? An information-based semantics aims to provide a naturalistic answer to this sort of question by looking to the information carried by the internal symbols; and the idea of
information-carrying is naturalized by appeal to relations of causal co-variance between symbols (the information-carriers) and things symbolized (the things that the information carried is about). In short, As carry information about Bs iff the generalization "Bs cause As" is true and counterfactual-supporting. There are refinements that Fodor introduces to this basic position; most of them enter to account for the possibility of misrepresentations or false beliefs and he finds himself having to make the most complicated maneuvers to do so. But once the refinements are in place the basic idea remains: 'Horse' means what it does because of the causal connections that hold between horses and tokens of 'Horse.' I will not spell out the refinements here. The point for now is that, despite its differences with Kripke, it is a strictly denotational semantics; and the explicit claim is that if meaning depends on nothing other than denotation, spelt out along these causal-information-theoretic lines, then there is no dependence of one meaning on any other meaning. For Fodor, the causal covariance, which naturalistically underpins a particular concept or mental representation, is describable independent of any other. Thus atomism, not anatomism.

I had said that my strategy would be one of asking whether he can get by with atomism. Since Fodor's version of the atomistic account is a strictly denotational account, our question must now be: Can he get by with just a denotational account of meaning?

The history of semantics would suggest that we cannot. Frege's puzzle and its recent descendant Kripke's puzzle come immediately to mind. Have they not instructed us that we cannot just get by with an atomism developed along these lines?

Because they are so well known and because there is a lot of ground to cover, I will not give a detailed exposition of these puzzles and the substitution problems that are often thought to make necessary the introduction of something over and above denotation in the study of meaning. Here are the barest bones of Kripke's puzzle. A Frenchman, Pierre, learns from his nanny, while growing up monolingually in Paris, something which he expresses by saying "Londres est jolie." When, later, Pierre goes and settles in an ugly section of London and after picking up the native language, he is disposed to say "London is not pretty." However, he doesn't
realize that the city he learnt about in Paris is the city of which he is now a resident. The example gives rise to a puzzle because, given certain assumptions (included among which is the assumption of a denotational conception of meaning and concepts), vii one would, by a short step, end up attributing blatantly inconsistent beliefs to Pierre. And since we may take for granted on the basis of the rest of his behaviour that Pierre is a logically acute man, there is a prima facie puzzle generated by the fact that he must be attributed a blatantly inconsistent belief. Charity requires that we do not rest with the charge of inconsistency but somehow explain it away. The puzzle is supposed to lie in the fact that explaining it away means giving up on seemingly obvious assumptions about the nature of meaning or content and its attribution.

The relevance of the puzzle to Fodor is obvious. The puzzle, as Frege intended it, arises only if one assumed, among other things, that there was nothing else to meaning than denotation. This assumption would have it that "London" and "Londres", (as "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus") are synonyms. Synonyms are freely substitutable. But substitution in these puzzle cases leads to uncharitable attribution of inconsistency. Thus the lesson seems to be that in these cases it is substitution which should be withheld, and therefore that these expressions should not be taken to be synonymous. The only way to avoid attributing these uncharitable things is to make it come out that "London" and "Londres", mean different things. That is, to make it come out that Pierre's "London"-beliefs and "Londres"-beliefs, are different beliefs. This is so even if Pierre apply the same predicates. If Pierre says "London is magnificent" and "Londres est magnifique" he must each be attributed two different beliefs. Not to do so would eventually give rise to the puzzle. But to do so, it seems requires going beyond denotation in the study of meaning, precisely what Fodor wants to avoid.

Fodor of course knows all about the problem that these puzzles raise for his denotational view of meaning, acknowledges it explicitly, and attempts to deal with it at length. viii

Any acknowledgement that there is a real problem raised by the puzzles is, on the face of it (that is on the face of the standard discussions of the subject), an acknowledgement that denotational views of content fail to fully capture an agent's senses or conceptions of the world.
It is this failure to capture an agent's conceptions of things, of London (or Venus), which
accounts for why these puzzles arise.

There is by now a familiar and orthodox response from contemporary philosophers of
mind to this problem. It is to say that in addition to an externalist and denotational semantics,
one needs another internal notion of meaning and intentional content which will capture an
agent's conceptions and resolve the puzzles. That is, over and above wide content there is another
notion of content.

(This second notion of content which has been called ‘narrow’ by contrast is often seen
as an ‘internal’ notion of content. I am not suggesting that it must be internal nor am I even
suggesting that we should say in general that we need two notions of content. I am only saying
that if one embraces Fodor’s notion of wide or denotational content, then a second notion of
content, whether internal or some non-Fodorean version of external content is forced on one.
My own view is that we should reject Fodor’s denotational idea of content and embrace a single
notion of externalist content which forces no second notion of content. But this paper will not
pursue my own positive views on this matter at all.)

This distinction between two notions of content forced by Fodor’s notion of denotational
content, of course echoes in the philosophy of mind a distinction also formulated to solve similar
puzzles by Frege in the Philosophy of Language. In the Philosophy of Mind, many philosophers
in this orthodoxy appeal to a notion of content based on functional/conceptual/inferential role of
our intentional states to characterize the non-denotational notion of content which will remove
the puzzles.

But, Fodor rejects this orthodox response deriving from Frege.

One reason for his rejecting it should be obvious from what has been said so far. To
believe in this second notion of content characterized in terms of functional role, which captures
an agent’s senses or conceptions of things, all amount to something that goes beyond atomism to
anatomism, and leads eventually to holism. All these things introduce the vehicles of cognitive
significance which inferentially interact with one another in a way that explains why an agent
who fails to know of a certain identity may fail to make certain inferences and, therefore, make certain inconsistent claims. Thus by introducing some holistic and inferential elements they explain (and explain away) why Kripke's Pierre says seemingly inconsistent things like "Londres est jolie" and "London is not pretty".

[I should express this point a little more cautiously since it is not absolutely inevitable that introducing senses just by itself leads to an abandonment of anti-holism. One may take a strictly Fregean view of sense which under some interpretations takes senses to be anti-holist; e.g., a strictly Platonist interpretation of sense need perhaps make no commitment to holism. Again Michael Dummett's highly verificationist reading of the notion of sense is also explicitly intended by him to be anti-holist. So, in saying that Fodor's rejection of senses is motivated partly by the anatomism inherent in the introduction of agents' conceptions of things, I am assuming (as I'm sure he is) that these anti-holist readings of sense are not plausible ways of spelling out the idea of agents' conceptions.]

Since the only plausible reading of this puzzle-solving response presupposes some holism, Fodor, being an anti-holist, must and does deny that one needs anything like this second notion of non-denotational content to get around the puzzles. He denies the claim that the resolution of these puzzles requires positing something like agents' conceptions defined in terms of functional and inferential role.

How could he reject such a thing?

His view seems to be this. The puzzles do arise for denotational semantics but that does not mean that we need to posit anything like agents' conceptions or content to explain the puzzles away. He grants that we need to posit modes of presentation over and above denotational content in our account of propositional attitudes, but he denies that these modes of presentation need to be seen as harbouring anything like conceptions or contents; they are rather sentences characterized in terms of syntax, more particularly orthography. i.e., the distinct names "London" and "Londres" are enough to characterize the difference in modes of presentation. Thus appeal to the diverging syntax of "London"-utterances and "Londres"-utterances is what explains the
puzzles away. Or, to put it more accurately for thought rather than utterances in a public language, modes of presentation are sentences in Mentalese and the puzzles are solved by the different constituents of these sentences [LONDON, LONDRES]. They are thus solved by something less than or other than an agent's conceptions.

Can this strategy for keeping out a holistic notion of content work? On the face of it, it would appear not. After all we are familiar with examples of the Frege and Kripke puzzles in which there is no diverging syntax or orthography, where there is only one name ("Paderewski"), not two.

Now, in these cases Fodor will no doubt say that the puzzles are put to rest by positing an uninscribed syntax. Thus, we might say that an agent possessed names with uninscribed (and unpronounced) subscripts, "Paderewski₁" and "Paderewski₂." The crucial point however is this. Once we allow any specifiable syntax which will distinguish between the "modes of presentations" and solve the puzzle, then we have what it takes to find yet other fresh examples to run the puzzle again. Whatever specifiable items solved the Paderewski puzzle, they are just like the items "London" and "Londres" in the sense that they solve the puzzle in virtue of being different orthographically characterizable, syntactic items. But now if they have the power to solve the puzzles in the way that the different "syntactic" items (the names "London" and Londres") did, and if as we saw, Paderewski poses a puzzle to which that sort of syntactic difference is irrelevant (there being only one inscribed name), then presumably further puzzles could arise when there is a syntactic difference, even at the level of this uninscribed (but presumably, in principle, inscribable) syntax. No reason has been given for why this should not be so. The plain fact seems to be that if uninscribed syntax has the power to solve the Paderewski puzzle then it contains the sort of items about which we can in principle specify two different syntactic configurations. And we also know that the items contained in an uninscribed syntax, so long as they are specifiable, are in general the sort of thing that we can run a fresh puzzle on any single one of them, just as we ran the Paderewski puzzle, after having solved the London/Londres puzzle. ("Paderewski" being the sort of thing that "London" and "Londres" are:
orthographically characterizable syntactic items. i.e., names!) In these fresh puzzles the structure of the Paderewski puzzle will be preserved, in the sense that there will at first sight be only one name or syntactic item; the only difference will be that the name will be part of an uninscribed but specifiable syntax rather than a superficially public syntax.

On what basis do I say that such fresh puzzles could arise? The fresh puzzles will be generated once again by the fact that an agent may behave or think in the appropriate way, i.e. draw or not draw certain inferences which lead him, like they led Pierre, to thinking and uttering inconsistencies. And these puzzles, I'm saying would be resolved once again by saying, as we did with Paderewski, that what seems like a single term of his (not this time in surface syntax but in the syntax of Mentalese, presumably configurations in brain-writing!) is really two terms expressing or carrying two different concepts.

The chief lesson to be learnt from this is the following. If we take the solutions to Kripke and Frege puzzles to lie in syntax, then these further and fresh puzzles (as well as the Paderewski puzzle) demonstrate vividly how there is really no conception of the syntax of (public) linguistic or mentalese vehicles which is altogether autonomous of a second notion of content. There is no such power possessed by syntax to solve the puzzles and yet be independent of causal or functional (including conceptual and inferential) role. For there is no coming to grips with syntax independently of making sense of the inferential behaviour of agents. These puzzles arise only because we see the inferential behaviour of agents (including the theoretical inferences they make) as reflecting a certain kind of inconsistency or irrationality. So if we wished to see the individuation of modes of presentation in terms of syntax, syntax itself had better be a fall-out of other things like functional role. If syntax is to solve the puzzles, there is no independent access to those aspects of syntax which will solve them, such that whether it is possible for a puzzle to arise or not depends on whether this independently accessible syntax has two syntactic items or not. It is simply not possible to preempt a puzzle from arising by saying that there is such an autonomous syntax and an independent survey of its items reveals that it does not contain the two terms or vehicles necessary for a puzzle to arise. Proof of this is that the Paderewski puzzle does
arise even though surface syntax (when described independently of interpretation of inferential thinking and behaviour) has only one term. It would be absurd to say that there is no Paderewski puzzle because we find only the one name "Paderewski" when we look at the agent's syntax independently of his inferential behaviour. It is because of the absurdity of this that we allow ourselves to posit two syntactic items to account for the puzzle's arising and thereby also solve the puzzle. In doing so we are acknowledging that it is the inferential rationality or irrationality of an agent which decides whether there is a puzzle, and so whenever there is a puzzle our syntax had better posit two terms, even if syntax when surveyed independently of the interpretation of inferential behaviour does not contain the two terms. If this is so of the Paderewski case, it is equally true of the further puzzles. No amount of talk of the syntax of Mentalese or talk of brain-writing is going to avoid the route to syntax via interpretation of inferential behaviour. So if one insists that it is syntax that will solve the puzzles, then the proper way to proceed is to see functional role as the dog and syntax as the tail, with the former wagging the latter. There is no leaving functional role out, thereby proving the point that no purely syntactic solution is ever going to arrest the generation of yet further puzzles, even if it solves any given puzzle.

Of course, someone might protest that syntax, in general, is surely not to be thought of as exclusively posited on the basis of such things as inference and behaviour, even if causal and inferential role is. That is plausible. But if it is plausible, the lesson to be learnt from it is that one should not appeal to syntax to solve puzzles which are essentially puzzles that are defined upon the failures of rationality in inferences.

The important point is that fresh puzzles cannot be raised once one introduces the functional roles (underlying the syntax) to solve the puzzles because unlike pure syntax, functional roles are defined (in part) upon the inferential and the behavioural output (given certain inputs and other internal states) of agents. It was an essential part of our description of the possibility of such fresh puzzles arising that the behaviour (including inferences) of agents reflects two different concepts or terms (even though the hitherto specified syntax suggests one). Since this behaviour and these inferences are, in turn, essential to the defining of the causal
dispositions and functional roles that yield a second notion of content, it would be impossible to try and extend these puzzles for the functional role solution because one would end up saying something incoherent like: the behaviour and inferences of agents suggests two different concepts even though the functional roles, which are defined upon that behaviour (and inferences), suggest one. Thus appeal to functional roles arrests the puzzle phenomena in a way that syntax by itself is powerless to do. Speaking generally, unlike syntax, it is the sole point of positing the notion of content characterized by functional role that it meet the constraint of rationality and consistency that is posed by the need to solve the Frege and Kripke style puzzles.

A desperate last-ditch effort to save the syntactic solution might propose that we should simply deny the puzzles as arising if an independent survey of the syntax of Mentalese, of the orthography of brain-writing, reveals that there is only one name. On such a proposal, we would be told that we must make such maneuver as the one I suggested in Note 14 and deny that what seems like puzzle-generating and inconsistent thought and speech is so. But notice the cost of saying this. We would be saying that there is a priori reason to expect perfect harmony between the configurations in the brain (characterized entirely in the first order, independent of functional role --since this is a purely syntactic solution) and states characterized as thought, inference, etc. But to say this is to assume a type-type physicalist reduction of thought, And that is surely not a cost that Fodor is prepared to pay, at least not without repudiating much of his previous work.

The foregoing considerations give an overwhelming reason to think that no purely syntactic solution to the puzzles is satisfactory, and something like functional roles have to be brought in. And if, in turn, any plausible understanding of the functional roles that characterize agents' conceptions and a second notion of content brings with it a certain amount of holism, then we can conclude that Fodor has not met our counter-challenge of managing without holism.
Fodor has claimed that denotational content is sufficient for the study of meaning and intentionality. In the last section, this was denied via a study of familiar puzzles, and reasons were given for the necessity of positing some notion of Fregean sense or non-denotational content; a notion of content which was holistic because it invoked functional and inferential roles to solve the puzzles. In this section, I will defend this general move by addressing two difficulties which elements in Fodor's writings pose for the very idea of sense, that is for the very idea of a notion of content that is over and above denotational content. This defence is needed because Fodor argues not merely that non-denotational content is not necessary to solve the puzzles but that it is not sufficient either.

First difficulty

The first difficulty might be raised for me along the following lines. Puzzles of the same basic structure as the original Frege and Kripke puzzles, which arose for the idea of meaning as denotation, may arise for the idea of meaning as conceptions of things as well. It is just as possible that an agent not know that one way in which he conceives of something (say, conceives of a city or a planet) is the same as another way that he conceives of it. This parallels the possibility of something that gave rise to the original puzzle -- the possibility of someone not knowing that the thing a concept or term of his denotes is the same thing as what some other term denotes. Hence the difficulty: introducing senses and ways of conceiving of things leaves us no better off than we were with denotation on the question of such puzzles.

This first difficulty is directly raised in some things that Fodor explicitly by some things that Fodor says. It is raised for instance by his appeal to Mates's problem at a crucial stage of his treatment of the puzzles. Suppose, Fodor argues, that we allow that 'unmarried man' is the sense of 'bachelor'. Then the belief-contents, "_ believes that Oedipus is a bachelor" and "_ believes that Oedipus is an unmarried man" should be counted as the same (via substitution) by any account which takes senses to be efficacious with the puzzles. But Mates showed that they are not the same by
pointing out that it is intuitive that someone might doubt that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a bachelor believes that he is an unmarried man, while he does not doubt (no one can doubt) that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a bachelor believes that he is a bachelor. So senses don't really solve the problem of substitutivity that is supposed to have been raised for the denotational view of meaning by the puzzles. They don't solve it because, as Mates's case is supposed to bring out, the context created by the idiom of doubt shows that an agent may be in exactly the same position with senses as Pierre is with a city and Frege's astronomer is with an object in the sky. He might wonder or doubt whether one is the same as the other.

Let us for the moment take it as obvious that no one can doubt that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a bachelor believes that Oedipus is a bachelor (though by the end of this discussion we may well want to say that to find this obvious is as hollow as finding obvious that no one can doubt that everybody who believes that Paderewski was a pianist believes that Paderewski was a pianist.) For reasons of space, I will not take up this parenthetical remark later but it ought not to be taken lightly at all.

Now, since Mates does allow it as a possibility, we must ask what sort of thing underlies someone's possible doubt that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a bachelor believes that Oedipus is an unmarried man. In other words what about a believer would lead someone to doubt that he believes that Oedipus is an unmarried man even though he believes that Oedipus is a bachelor. It can only be that the believer does not know the sense of his own terms and concepts (in this case the sense of his term 'bachelor'); he does not know his own conceptions of things.

And to say this is just to say that he does not know some of his own intentional contents, because 'senses' and 'conceptions of things' are none other than a person's beliefs contents. i.e., to say that a description like "the city I am now living in" which attaches to Pierre's term "London" and in part captures Pierre's sense for or conception of London, is after all to say that a belief with a certain content could be ascribed to Pierre, viz., the belief that London is the city he is
now living in. So to say that he may not know his own senses is to say that he does not know such among his own beliefs.

Notice that in claiming that one can fail to know of the identity of one's conceptions of things or contents, this Matesian complaint presupposes that there is a philosophical way of making self-knowledge of one's intentional contents come apart from those intentional contents. I stress 'philosophical' ways to contrast it with 'psychological' ways. This terminology to describe the contrast is a little crude here but, for reasons of space, I will not try and refine it. All the same the contrast is absolutely pivotal because I think we should find ourselves with very different responses to the idea that we lack self-knowledge of our contents, depending on which of these two ways are said to be the cause of its lack.

I think we ought not to allow anything but the ordinary and familiar psychological obstacles to the psychological state of knowing that one thinks something. Of course, we should allow (as "Cartesians" about content would not) that there are psychological phenomena like self-deception, inattention and other such (the most interesting of which were studied by Freud) which do make self-knowledge come apart from content. In saying this, one is endorsing anti-"Cartesianism". But apart from such psychological phenomena which may constitute good reasons for denying that we have self-knowledge of our contents, there ought not to be any other way of denying the assumption that we do have self-knowledge of our contents. To allow other ways of denying it, to allow a denial of self-knowledge on the basis of abstract philosophical doctrines, is to be too zealously anti-"Cartesian". Actually it need not always be a matter of anti-"Cartesian" zealotry. It is also likely that many philosophers who allow this make an uncritical and careless slide. Given that self-knowledge may in any case be blocked by psychological obstacles, they slide into allowing it also to be blocked by quite different and unintuitive and unacceptable things, simply out of a careless failure to distinguish between these two different (i.e., psychological and non-psychological) ways of allowing it to be blocked."
Fodor's Matesian complaint against conceptions of things (that they fail to get rid of the puzzles) precisely depends on such an uncritical and unintuitive denial of self-knowledge of contents on abstract philosophical (not psychological) grounds.

What are the philosophical grounds which could underlie the Matesian complaint against senses that we may not know that one way we conceive of something is the same as another way we conceive of it? More generally, what philosophical elements (as opposed to the psychological ones we have mentioned) could underlie the general possibility that one may fail to know one's senses and non-denotational contents? There are two sorts of philosophical ground that could underlie it, and I suspect it is the second one which actually does underlie Fodor's appeal to Mates.

One ground which would issue in the complaint is that senses or agents' conceptions of objects are themselves objects. That is, they are objects of an agent's thinking. And an agent can therefore fail to know of the identity of some of these objects. This is to allow for failure of self-knowledge of contents, not due to factors like self-deception and other Freudian and psychological phenomena, but rather because of an abstract philosophical assumption that one's contents are the inner objects or targets of thought, about which we may fail to know identities in just the way that we may fail to know the identity of planets and cities, i.e., in just the way we fail to know the identity of external objects such as Hesperus and Phosphorus or London and Londres. Failure to know these latter identities of external objects gave rise to the original puzzles for a denotational notion of meaning. Similarly, if contents are internal objects, then a parallel failure to know identities would give rise to parallel puzzles for a sense-based notion of meaning.

In rejecting Fodor's complaint about such parallel puzzles arising for senses, therefore, I deny one of its possible philosophical grounds, viz., that there are objects of thought.

This assumption that there are objects of thought is wholly unmotivated and unnecessary for anything we want from content. There is absolutely nothing gained in our understanding of the nature of content to see contents as objects of thought. Philosophers have thought that there
must be objects of thoughts for various reasons. Some, in earlier times, thought that they are necessary to account for the fact that we can make mistakes about the world. Only if we have intermediary epistemological objects of thought between us and the world could we make perceptual mistakes about what is in the world. Such Cartesian epistemological intermediaries (also subscribed to by some traditional and modern empiricists) are wholly unnecessary, as many philosophers from Kant onward have argued. Others more recently have posited objects of thought (this time sentential objects) because it seemed to them to follow from the fact that thoughts have specifiable contents that there are internal objects that were being specified. But objects of thought are equally unnecessary in order to characterize the specifiability of content. Reports of intentionality attribute certain states to us. And just because we need sentences of ours to keep track of and report and specify an agent's intentional states, it simply does not follow from this that an agent's thought's must themselves have sentential objects, with which she stands in psychological relations. As Davidson has pointed out to be in an intentional state is just that, to be in a state which we keep track of by using our sentences. It is quite uncalled for to say that the only way to think of these states as real is to go on to say that there is an entity called a state that one is in and with which we stand in psychological relations.

But quite apart from the fact that the thesis that there are objects of thoughts is totally unnecessary for anything, the fact is that it seems also to be positively implausible because it seems to allow for the possibility of lack of self-knowledge in a way that we should want to rule out. Self-knowledge of many contents may indeed be missing in agents. But that is because of specific psychological reasons, the most interesting of which, as I said, were studied by Freud. But we should not want to threaten self-knowledge on abstract philosophical grounds, grounds such as that there are objects of thoughts which we may fail to grasp, or identities between such objects which we may fail to grasp. Objects of thoughts are, therefore, not merely unnecessary, they are a positive menace because they overturn a very strong intuition we have, the intuition that we have self-knowledge of our contents, unless and only unless, there are good psychological obstacles to having it.
And once we see this, one temptation to say that parallel puzzles may arise for a non-denotational, anatomistic notion of meaning is removed.

However, that there are objects of thought is not the only philosophical (non-psychological) ground which gives rise to the idea that we may not know our own conceptions, and therefore gives rise to Fodor's complaint that senses would not remove the puzzles. In fact I have no direct evidence that Fodor himself is committed to there being objects of thought. I don't think, for instance, that his espousal and promotion of the language of thought thesis is necessarily indirect evidence that he is committed to them. The thesis may give the impression of the commitment since sentences in the head may seem like prime candidates for being the objects of thought. But the idea of sentences in the head by no means, in itself, entails that these sentences are objects of thought with which we have psychological relations. That requires further argument.

But there is another philosophical (rather than psychological) ground which gives rise to the idea that we may not know our own senses or conceptions of things; and it is something which Fodor does uncritically take for granted in his discussion of Mates's example. He takes for granted that a person's sense for bachelor is given in the sociolect of the person. That is to say that the sociolect constitutes the senses of the person's concepts. This assumption of a socially constituted notion of sense, however, does not give a fair chance to the appeal to senses to solve the puzzles.xix

That Fodor takes this assumption for granted in his Matesian argument emerges clearly if we look at his discussion of Kripke's puzzle in the context of his Matesian argument. He says:.

"... doubt on the claim that failures of substitution salve veritate in belief contexts are ipso facto arguments for nonsynonymy. Reflection on Kripke's example about Pierre makes this claim ...questionable -- at least if you're prepared to believe that translation is a test for synonymy...."London" translates as "Londres", if anything translates as anything. So, if translations are ipso facto synonymous, it would seem that there's at least one case where you
can't infer difference of meaning from failure of substitution ... "London","Londones" is bad news for Frege's strategy of explaining failures of substitution by positing differences of sense...."

Here Fodor is suggesting that the Kripke puzzle has a special feature over and above the features it shares with the Frege puzzle. He says that translation is a test for synonymy and then says that since 'London' translates 'Londres', and since the point of the puzzle is to show that one is not substitutable for the other, this is a case of how one can't infer difference of meaning from a failure of substitution. The case is supposed to be different from the Frege puzzle where translation does not enter into the issues at all, and so in Frege's puzzle we are not in a position to say that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are synonymous on the basis of a translation test.

In these remarks about translation and Kripke's puzzle, the assumption of a sociolectical constitution of individual sense, is clearly present..

But it is entirely unfair that someone who appeals to senses or agents' conceptions to solve the Kripke puzzle should be landed with this assumption that the senses he appeals to must be socially constituted. The assumption's unfairness to the sense theorist is not necessarily to be expressed by saying that it is the translation test for sameness of meaning which is unfair; it could equally be said that the claim that (in Pierre's case) 'London' translates 'Londres' is unfair. Remember the appeal to senses to provide one with difference of content is precisely supposed to offer one a fineness of grain in what is to count as a translation and what is not, a fineness of grain which is missing prior to the introduction of sense. No doubt in the sociolects (English, French) 'London' and 'Londres' are translated one into the other; but the introduction of senses requisite to solve the puzzles introduces an element which asks for Pierre to be treated as being idiosyncratic because of his lack of knowledge of a certain identity. Therefore we cannot impose on his idiolect what we take for granted in a consideration of sociolects. So while we are considering not natural language meanings but belief contents, that is, while we are considering the 'mental' in Burge's famous title "Individualism and the Mental", it is, I would say, a mistake to assume that translation preserves denotation and truth-conditions or even sense, if sense is
taken to be socially constituted. But Fodor works with exactly this mistaken assumption and it is
this mistaken assumption which imposes an unfairness on the appeal to senses, allowing Fodor to
run away with the impression that reflection on Kripke's puzzle fortifies his argument's appeal to
Mates's problem.

Hence equally in the Mates example itself, it is the assumption of social constitution of
sense (the assumption that some individual agent's term "bachelor" has a socially constituted
sense, i.e., "unmarried man", which the individual agent is possibly not aware of) that is making
the trouble. It is this assumption which allows for the possibility that an agent believe that
Oedipus is a bachelor without believing that Oedipus is an unmarried man, and thereby allows
Mates and Fodor to say that we may doubt that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a
bachelor believes that Oedipus is an unmarried man. This assumption allows all this for the
simple reason that an individual agent may not know crucial things in the communal usage of his
terms, which nevertheless is supposed to constitute the sense of his terms. Thus in rejecting
Fodor's Matesian argument against senses, the sense-theorist must reject this social assumption in
the characterization of sense. Without this assumption, the Mates argument does not go through.
Without the assumption, we cannot doubt that everybody who believes that Oedipus is a bachelor
believes that Oedipus is an unmarried man. If this is right then Mates has not shown that we may
not know that one way we conceive of something is the same as another way we conceive of it.
So there can be no parallel puzzles for meaning qua conceptions of things.

I admit that it has not always been made clear by those who appeal to senses to remove
these puzzles that one ought to distinguish between sociolectical and idiolectical, or more
precisely between social externalist and individualist, conceptions of sense; but that just shows
that the merit in the difficulty that Fodor raises is not that it devastates the theorists of sense but
rather that it forces them to be more careful and nuanced in their formulation of the theory than
they have hitherto tended to be. Even having admitted this, I think it is textually fair to say that
despite his platonistic reifications of the notion of sense and despite his somewhat irrational
horror of all signs of psychologism, even Frege himself was, in at least one place, already an
antecedent in this more careful individualistic formulation of the notion of sense -- in the famous footnote on Aristotle in the essay "On Sense and Reference".

I have explored two questionable grounds and assumptions which would give rise to Fodor's complaint that it is just as possible to fail to know the identity of one's senses as it is to fail to know the identity of objects which are denoted by one's terms or concepts. Both these assumptions threaten one's self knowledge of one's own mental states on abstract philosophical grounds, grounds such as (1) a doctrine about objects of thoughts and (2) a doctrine about the social constitution of the non-denotational or 'sense' aspects of the concepts in one's idiolect. And my claim has been that unlike psychological grounds such as self-deception, or various other forms of the censor function, or even just plain inattention, these abstract philosophical doctrines are unworthy grounds to give up on our intuitive commitment to the idea that we have knowledge of our own intentional contents and senses.

Senses and non-denotational content are constituted to solve the Frege and Kripke style puzzles and the first of the difficulties posed by Fodor does not do anything to put this into doubt.

Second Difficulty

The second difficulty for the idea that senses or conceptions of things will remove the puzzles is raised by both Fodor and Lepore in their new book Holism: A Shopper's Guide.

I have been pursuing the orthodox view which argues that if one believes in an atomistic denotational semantics then one can only solve the puzzles by introducing a second non-denotational semantics, which will do the things that denotational semantics cannot do, i.e. bring in the agents' perspectival element and thus capture the inferential interaction between beliefs which will allow us to solve the puzzles (and actually more generally will allow us to explain or rationalize agents' actions). The second difficulty against this orthodoxy is well stated in a quote from their book and it is a difficulty for the very idea of there being two notions of meaning and
Here is what they say [I'm paraphrasing only a bit to make it match my own terminology]:

"Suppose... that we grant a second notion of non-denotational content... perhaps this gives us enough freedom to do the job in principle, but there's a price to pay for the extra power that is provided by the second notion..... We now have to face the nasty question, what keeps the two notions of content stuck together? For example, what prevents there being an expression that has an inferential role appropriate to the content that 4 is a prime number but the truth-conditions of the content water is wet".[their italics]

They raise this objection against Ned Block in particular and go on to make some criticisms of Block's efforts at dealing with this problem for what they call the "two-factor" account of content. But I would argue that the raising of this second difficulty is possible only because of an assumption which Fodor and Lepore make, and which Ned Block may well not share, nor need anybody who believes in two notions of content

This is the assumption that the first or denotational notion of content (which we are supplementing with the second notion of content in order to rescue from the puzzles) is to be spelt out along the naturalistic, information-theoretic lines that Fodor proposes in his two earlier books *Psychosemantics* and *A Theory of Content*. That is to say, it is arguable that if one had a notion of denotational content that was not based on the information-theoretic story that Fodor tells but more traditionally in the way that was hinted at in Kripke and developed in detail by others, then it is easier to avoid this second difficult that Fodor and Lepore raise for a second or non-denotational notion of content.

What I have in mind is just this. If one elaborated denotational content with the traditional causal account rather than the naturalistic, informational account, then it should be possible to say something like the following in order to ensure that the second notion of narrow content does not come "unstuck" from it: The conditions in virtue of which a speaker's token of
a word refers to a particular object will include not only conditions specifying the causal history of the functional state token underlying the use or word of the token, but conditions specifying the subject's functional makeup. The latter conditions will be a non-cancellable part of the causal account of reference or denotation itself.

These conditions include a variety of different things. For one thing, the subject will have to have various appropriate intentions. Whether a subject's use of a word token picks out the usual referent for tokens of that type will depend on the subject's having intended to use the word as it is used in the relevant community, as well other more obvious things such as having intended to use it on this particular occasion to refer at all (rather than, say, to hear the sound of his own voice). Moreover, it will depend on whether the subject can use the term (or think the concept) correctly in a fair number of inferences and whether the term (concept) is suitably connected with the subject's recognition procedures.

All this means that a causal account of denotation does not preempt the role of a second notion of "narrow" or functional role content, but rather such a second notion of content is built into any plausible version of a causal account of denotational content itself. Of course this means that the substantive work in spelling out the functional or narrow psychological conditions necessary for a subject's referring to a particular object remains to be done. But, on this traditional view where the two notions of content are not pitted in a hostile (or indifferent) contrast, this is as much a task for the first (wide or denotational) notion of content as it is for a second (narrow) notion of content. It is their combined task and so there is no principled reason to think that there is always a danger that the two notions of content will come unstuck, or to think that it is something of a fluke that the two notions of content are calibrated when they are.

Let's just see this point through with some of the conditions I have mentioned. Take the condition of intending to refer to what the community refers to. Thus suppose a man says that by now familiar thing "I have arthritis in my thigh". A traditional causal theorist of the sort I am considering is not likely to ascribe the concept of arthritis (defined in terms of its extension) to this person, if the person thought that arthritis was, say, a bunch of bullets. But instead, if like
the less waywardly ignorant protagonist in Burge's example, he were to have thought arthritis
was a disease, a disease which was painful, which afflicts older people more than younger, the
traditional causal theorist would ascribe the concept of arthritis to him. Why is this? Because in
the second case and not the first case there is some evidence on the basis of which we may
ascribe to him the intention to at least be trying to refer with the token to what his community
refers to with other tokens of the same type (assuming of course that it is an English speaking
community). If, as one of the conditions says, this intention is essential to our overall causal
account of denotation, then though there is still a difference between wide and narrow content
ascriptions to him (manifest in the fact that he has the extensionally defined concept of arthritis
but is nevertheless saying that he has arthritis in his thigh) the difference cannot amount to the
sort of lunatic divergence that would exist if his narrow concept of arthritis was specified (among
other things) in the proposition that arthritis was a bunch of bullets.

In denying the possibility of such lunatic divergence in this way, have I succumbed to the
opposite danger, viz., that the introduction of these intentional and functional considerations as
being integral to a causal account of denotation will have collapsed the second or narrow notion
of content with the first or wide? Will it have undermined the claim that there are two factors
after all? It is worth repeating that there is no reason to think so. Insisting on the intention to
refer with one's word token to an object that the community refers to with other tokens of the
same word may rule out the man who believes that arthritis is a bunch of bullets, but it is still
going to rule in agents whose articulated explications of the word, even though they diverge from
the extension in less extreme ways, nevertheless do diverge from it in crucial ways. For
example, as I said, the Burgean protagonist, who even though he is ignorant in less extreme
ways, is still ignorant enough to say "I have arthritis in my thigh". This is proof that his narrow
concept of arthritis (among other things, that it is a disease of the joints and ligaments) does not
coincide with the wide content, (assuming of course that "arthritis" is a natural kind term,
however low grade, and its extension is given in its scientific essence which according to the
scientific expert is that it is a disease of the joints only.) If the traditional causal account of
denotation does rule in such an agent whose narrow and wide contents do not coincide, then there is no collapse of the distinction.

Yet it does rule out the agent whose narrow concept and content of "arthritis" is that it is a bunch of bullets. It rules him out because we would have no evidence that such an agent is even intending to refer with his tokens to what the community refers to in its linguistic usage. I conclude then that the traditional causal theorist who insists on these intentions, among other things, as an integral part of his doctrine of denotation, will thereby ensure that the notion of wide content, though distinct from narrow content, will nevertheless calibrate reasonably with the specifications of narrow content in precisely the way that Fodor and Lepore deny in the second difficulty they raise for non-denotational account.

But, as I said, none of what I have been saying in the last few paragraphs is relevant if one takes denotation to be spelt out along Fodor's causal information-theoretic lines because there is no real place there for bringing in such things as the features of the speaker's functional make-up and his intentions to refer with his word token on a particular occasion to what the word type refers to in the community, etc. There the whole point is to see word-world relations as being entirely dominated by the causal covariances which underlie them, independent of a subject's intentions. The reasons for this is itself obvious. First, bringing in those things spoils the naturalistic, information-theoretic ideal of denotation. Second, and relatedly, bringing in these conditions which allow the two factors to calibrate can only be done if one brings in anatomist elements in one's understanding of denotation. And the beauty of denotation for Fodor is precisely that it avoids these anatomistic elements.

So there is no gainsaying that there is a crippling difficulty of how to calibrate the two notions of content, once one adopts Fodor's very specific version of denotational content. I just wanted to point out that the difficulty only arises on the assumption that we have adopted it instead of the more traditional causal notion of denotation. It may even be that there are real advantages that Fodor can claim for his causal view over Kripke's and others' causal accounts of denotation. But then that is where the dispute lies rather than right here in the difficulty that
Fodor and Lepore are raising for Ned Block. For I assume Block had all along had a non-informational view of denotation and of the first or wide notion of content. So it is possible for Block to help himself to all these considerations of how, among other things, denotation turns on such things as speakers' intentions to calibrate their denotations with the community's, and thereby avoid this difficulty that Fodor and Lepore raise for him.

It is possible that Fodor and Lepore will object that in this defence of Block's two-factor strategy, I have wrongly invoked a speaker's intentions to refer with his words in ways that track the community's usage. The objection will be that Block (like Fodor and unlike, say Kripke) is talking of the denotation of tokens of mental representations, and the items that represent in mentalese are not the sorts of things that we have intentions towards; we only have intentions towards public language items.

Two comments, weaker and stronger. First, weaker. At the very least this shows that Fodor and Lepore should restrict their anti-holistic arguments to meaning in the language of thought, and not apply it to all notions of meaning and content. This would once again presuppose very specific commitments of Fodor's own positive view in arguing against holists, many of whom have no commitments to Mentalese at all. But second, much more strongly, it must be pointed out that the intention to use words as others in the community do is only one of the constraints that a two-factor theorist like Block can appeal to. I had mentioned other ways in which a two-factor theorist can constrain his causal account of denotation, so that the two factors calibrate more than Fodor and Lepore allow. Apart from the intention to refer with a token as others do, I had suggested other facts about the agent's functional makeup, facts such as the mental token's occurrence in a reasonable number of the right sorts of inference, and its being backed up by certain sorts of recognition procedures. These are constraints that do not just attach to public language items. They apply even when what we are considering is mental representations. The only things they do not apply to are mental representations which are elaborated by a theory of denotation which is information-theoretic and naturalistic along the
very specific lines that Fodor's positive account proposes. But why should Block and other two-
factor theorists buy into anything like that for their notion of denotation?

All this shows again that Fodor and Lepore in their criticisms of various holist philosophers, presuppose Fodor's specific account of content. Hence their claim that their book is only making the **negative** and modest claim that there are no arguments for holism (rather than advocating any particular anti-holist view) does not ring quite true. It is only from the point of a view of Fodor's own very specific **positive** conception of content that their negative claim is supportable.

We cannot here take up in detail the question of whether Fodor's positive causal-
informational account is the better denotational account or the more traditional causal-theoretic denotational account. It is enough to say that if we were tempted to say that Fodor's account is the better, that only shows that Fodor is now stuck with the Frege and Kripke puzzles without **any** solution. This is because the **only** solution there is to the puzzles for someone who believes in denotational content is (as Section I established) a second notion of non-denotational content. And if the best version of denotational content is not guaranteed to calibrate more or less successfully with this second notion of content, the puzzles will remain unsolved. I would have thought that that is in itself decisive retrospective proof that (whatever advantages it otherwise may have) in the final weighing of issues, Fodor's account of denotation cannot in fact be better than the traditional account.

In any case, we can conclude this discussion of the second difficulty by leaving Fodor with a dilemma: **Either** a denotational notion of content is supplemented by an anatomistic notion of content with which it calibrates (as the more traditional denotational accounts allow), in which case Fodor fails to meet our counter-challenge of doing without holism. **Or** a denotational notion of content (like Fodor's) cannot be supplemented with another notion of content because of calibration problems. And to say that is to say that it is stuck insolubly with the puzzles we raised in Section I since we showed there that syntax alone, without a second more holistic notion of content, could not arrest these puzzles.
As I said towards the beginning of the paper, my own view is not that there are really two notions of content. In fact, I think it is one of the more interesting and urgent tasks for philosophers of mind to fashion a notion of intentional content (a single notion) which is at once constituted by an intentional agent’s relations with the external world and at the same time meets a constraint implied by the point underlying the Frege (and the Kripke) puzzles. In other words the task should be to provide a theory of content which satisfies two constraints.  

1) There is the constraint (lets call it the Frege-style puzzle constraint) which requires roughly that the beliefs ascribed to an agent should make the agent rational by his or her own lights. In particular, if an agent is merely ignorant or misinformed, the beliefs ascribed should represent a completely consistent state of affairs, i.e., the world as the agent conceptualizes it.  

2) The theory should not characterize the subject’s psychology in such a way that as to allow for radical Cartesian scepticism about the external world, that is, it should not be possible for an agent’s beliefs to be completely at odds with the agent’s external circumstances. This is the requirement that externalism be in some sense true.

In this paper I have argued that the sense in which Fodor has it that externalism is true (his version of a denotationalism) is such that his notion of content cannot also meet the first constraint. What that means is that we really need to fashion a new form of externalism. There are other forms of externalism than Fodor’s available, of course: Kripke’s and Putnam’s, McDowell’s and Evans’s, and Davidson’s, to name just three. We should assess all these for whether they meet the first constraint. My own view is that none of them do so without strain, thought that is a claim I cannot redeem here. But if I am right, it remains one of the central tasks in the Philosophy of Language and Mind that we do fashion the right form of externalism.

ii I have tried to address Dummett's anti-holism in my "Meaning, Holism and Use" in E. Lepore (ed.) Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). and in "Dummett, Realism and Other Minds" in B. McGuinness and G. Oliveri (eds.) The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1994)


iv For Fodor to accept anatomism is as bad as embracing holism. He believes that there is no way to avoid the latter if one accepts the former unless one buys into an analytic-synthetic distinction. I will not take up this issue here, but rather take for granted that this is so. In my review of Fodor and Lepore's book, (forthcoming in Journal of Philosophy) I discuss this issue in some detail


vi See Kripke, S "A Puzzle about Belief" in Margalit, A (ed) Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976)

vii It is not necessary for my purposes here to spell out the other assumptions. There is a discussion below in Section II of one of them, having to do with translation.
See his important chapter entitled "Substitution Arguments and Individuation of Beliefs" in *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. See also his *The Elm and the Expert*. (M.I.T. Press, 1994).

In the former work Fodor seems sometimes to give the impression that he is undecided about whether to appeal to pure syntax or to functional roles to deal with the Frege and Kripke puzzles. In the second and later work there is an unambiguous appeal to syntax only. In both works he is of course clear that he is not appealing to *content* of any kind to deal with them. It is obvious that appeal to syntax is not appealing to anything like content in the sense of conceptions of the world. It is far from obvious that an appeal to functional role is not an appeal to something like conceptions of things or content. Some eliminativist philosophers may like to think of functional role entirely in terms of internal machinery and not as involving content at all. Perhaps that is what Fodor had in mind when he seems to half appeal to functional role in the earlier of the works referred to in this note. In any case that is not his current view so I will not take it up here at all and restrict myself to the syntactic solution. I address the question of whether there can be an eliminativist and non-contentful notion of functional role at length in chapter 6 of my forthcoming book *Self-Knowledge and Intentionality* (Harvard University Press).

Two important points.

First, though Frege's introduction of the notion of sense to supplement denotation is an example of this response, Kripke's response, which is in any case made with great tentativeness, makes no such conclusion about supplementing denotation with another element in concept-individuation. Second, it is not only the Frege and Kripke style puzzles which prompt philosophers to posit this second notion of internal content.

Things are, in fact, a little more complicated in a way that does not much concern us here, so I will put the complication in this note. Its not that Fodor is, in general, against any idea of a
second notion of content. He in fact believes in one. But he does not think that the need to capture inferential role and agents' conceptions is what forces this second notion. His motivation -- see his Psychosemantics, ch.2 -- for positing a second notion of content is that there should be a notion of content that supervenes on the interior of agents so as to allow for an ultimate internal reduction over and above the external information-theoretic reduction he favours. The purpose there is metaphysical and has not much to do with solving Frege and Kripke style puzzles. Therefore the second notion that he favours for this purpose has nothing to do with sense but is one that derives from Kaplan's idea of 'character', introduced by Kaplan initially to deal with indexicals. It is should be obvious, however, that by itself this notion could not help at all with the inferential element needed to capture an agent's conceptions of things. Nor is it taken to be so by Fodor.

xi See Kripke, ibid.

xii I am assuming here that we have to our own satisfaction found that there really is puzzle-generating inferential behaviour on the part of the agent, i.e., he is not, say, hallucinating somebody else when he thinks either "Paderewski is a pianist" or when he thinks "Paderewski is not a pianist", so that one of these thoughts or utterances could be dismissed as mis-speakings or mis-thinkings.

xiii This difficulty for the "sense" solution to the puzzles should not be confused with the criticism I made against the syntactic solution to the puzzles. The present difficulty is not that the denotation of two terms is not known to be identical, but rather that the senses of two terms are not known to be identical. By contrast my criticism of the syntactic solution was that one could keep raising the puzzle about the denotation of two terms not being known to be identical against any given syntactic solution. In short, the present difficulty is one of parallel puzzles arising about senses, whereas the criticism of the
syntactic solution was that there was no arresting the same kind of puzzles about denotation from keeping on arising.

xiv See "Substitution Arguments and Individuation of Beliefs", pp.164-165. See also Holism: A Shopper's Guide, p.239, n.6, and p.240, n.9, for exactly the same point.

 xv I place "Cartesian" in quotes in order to gesture at the possibility that recent attacks on a certain subjectivist position defining self-awareness into the very idea of mentality, may be attacking a position that is wrongly attributed to Descartes. Since the label usually employed in these attacks for their targets is "Cartesianism", so I am following their terminology. Perhaps I should have also made exactly this warning for my use of the term "Platonism" at various points in this paper.

xvi For this distinction and this point, see my "An Externalist Account of Self-Knowledge", Philosophical Topics, vol. 15, no.1, 1987. I discuss it at greater length in Belief and Meaning. And I discuss it, and a host of related issues having to do with self-knowledge, in my forthcoming book Self-Knowledge and Intentionality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)

xvii In recent years Paul Churchland was the first to have argued that objects of thought are unnecessary. See Churchland, P., Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979). More recently, Davidson has also argued it with more nuance and detail. See Davidson,D., "What is Present to the Mind" in Consciousness ed. E. Villanueva (California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991) In the volume in which Davidson's article appears, I argue that Davidson is right to deny objects of thought but wrong to say, as he does, that Putnam, Fodor and others subscribe to the thesis that there are objects of
thought. Both there and here below I argue that Putnam. Fodor etc, run afoul of self-knowledge considerations for quite other reasons, reasons which are separable from a commitment to the objects of thought thesis.

There is a temptation to think that a denial of epistemological intermediaries in perception entails embracing some form of Russellian thesis about demonstrative and perceptual thought, as one finds it in philosophers such as Evans and McDowell. This is a mistake. One could retain the idea that perceptual and demonstrative belief is not Russellian and reject epistemological intermediaries; and one should reject both of these things. See chapter 4 of my Belief and Meaning.

Recall here that I am only concerned with senses. I do not have to take a stand on whether reference is socially constituted or not. My subject is not referential or wide content. My subject is only that notion of non-denotational content that tries to get us out of the puzzles. So as far as my concerns in these first two sections go, I do not have to disagree with anybody who says that wide content is socially constituted so long as they allow for another notion of content, which is not socially constituted. Thus to the extent that it is only wide content that the Burgean phenomena applies to my quarrel here is not with Burge himself, whatever view I may take of wide content elsewhere. (I do discuss and criticize Burge at length in Belief and Meaning. Burge is a specially complicated case because he never uses the word "wide" content and denies that you need any other notion of content but his socially constituted notion of content; so he denies both wide and narrow content. But, as I argue there, this denial is quite unfeasible if one takes his view of the social constitution of content. Socially constituted content in his sense is wide content, despite his denial of it, and it needs supplementation with another notion of content, again despite his denial of that.)

Fodor cannot of course be opposed to any two notions of content because he has elsewhere argued, rightly I think, that his own way of spelling out a second notion of content based on Kaplan's notion of character (see our note 10 above) need not involve him in this second difficulty, which is only a difficulty raised against a notion that brings in the notion of sense or conceptions of things in articulated that-clauses.


Devitt, M. Designation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). See also White, S. "Partial Character and the Language of Thought", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 1982, whose version of the two notions of content is appropriately sophisticated for the anti-Fodor point made above.