My main interests are at the intersection of the philosophy of action, social theory, and ethics. More specifically, I am interested in accounting for the essentially social dimensions of human agency and the ways in which social practices and institutions condition a person’s self-understanding when acting, her sense of what it is she is doing and why. I propose in my dissertation that the perspective that a person takes towards herself in paradigmatic cases of action is not first-personal but rather impersonal—that is, it is grounded in generic and impersonal social norms rather than individual values and commitments—and that, once this is recognized, it has serious implications for philosophical accounts of normativity, ideology, marginalization, and freedom.
I also do research on the existential tradition and draw especially on Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of human agency in my work. Beyond this, I have further interests in the philosophy of art, feminist theory (especially Judith Butler), and the late Wittgenstein.