Katharine McIntyre

Title | Organization: 
Job Candidate | Ph.D. in Philosophy

2018-2019 TOMS Core Faculty Fellow: Literature Humanities

2017-2018 TOMS Core Faculty Fellow: Literature Humanities

2016-2017 Core Lecturer: Literature Humanities

Areas of Specialization: 

19th- and 20th-century European Philosophy; Social Philosophy (especially Hegel, Nietzsche, Foucault, and contemporary critical theory)

Areas of Competence: 

Philosophy of Feminism; Ethics/Applied Ethics; Logic (introductory classical and introductory non-classical); Philosophy of Literature


‘Domination’ as opposed to what?  Michel Foucault offers compelling accounts of unnoticed forms of social domination, yet says little about the freedom that we should, presumably, prefer. Discovering the concept of freedom that properly opposes the Foucauldian concept of domination reveals the possibilities and limitations of the usefulness of Foucault’s account of power for social criticism.  The first step in this endeavor is therefore to distinguish between Foucault's own use of the terms 'power' and 'domination' – the conflation of which is a source of criticism of his social theory.  With this distinction in hand, I demonstrate that Foucault’s genealogical period with its diagnosis of subjection is wholly compatible with, and indeed inseparable from, his ethical period with its emphasis on self-transformation.  Read as two sides of a coin, these periods of Foucault’s work establish the terms in which we must understand the ethico-political struggle in which we constantly find ourselves as subjects of self-transformation embedded in identity-constituting relations of power. I then explore Foucault’s criticism of the modern concept of autonomy, which he believes to be inherited from the Enlightenment and, more specifically, Kant.  In spite of these criticisms, Foucault does not dispense with the concept of freedom as autonomy altogether, but instead must embrace a concept of social freedom, similar to that which is found in contemporary recognition theory.  Therefore, we should characterize Foucault’s normative stance as that of a coupling of a general concept of social freedom with what I call a "metaethico-political openness principle" committing us to acts of resistance that would attempt to push the boundaries of recognition so that we may affirm previously unimagined ways of life.