22nd Annual
Columbia-NYU
Graduate
Conference in Philosophy

SATURDAY
APRIL 2
2022

KEYNOTE SPEAKER
SHAMIK DASGUPTA
Associate Professor of Philosophy,
UC Berkeley
"Objectivity as a Normative Notion"

MATTEO NIZZARDO,
University of St Andrews
"The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest
Interesting Interpretation"

NICK KÜSPERT,
University of St Andrews
"Why Moral Conciliationism
Does Not entail Moral
Scepticism"

QIONG WU,
University of Notre Dame
"Anti-realism about Modality and the
Contingency Problem"

EVAN WELCHANCE,
University of Virginia
"Acquaintability and Ordinary Ontology"

All talks to be held over Zoom, starting at 10:30 AM Eastern Time.
RSVP at https://bit.ly/36TcUMn. Please send any questions to
columbianyu.philgradconference@gmail.com
Matteo Nizzardo, University of St. Andrews
"The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest Interesting Interpretation"

Abstract: According to Strawson (1959) the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) holds that no two individuals can share all their qualitative properties. This view has been challenged by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006), who suggests a weaker non-trivial interpretation of PII which quantifies only over nontrivializing properties. I argue that this reading of PII entails an infinite regress, which can be avoided only by committing to solo numero difference. This can be generalised to any interpretation of PII that is weaker than Strawson’s. I conclude that the weakest version of PII worth discussing is the one restricting the domain of quantification to qualitative properties only.

Nick Küspert, University of St. Andrews
"Why Moral Conciliationalism Does Not Entail Moral Scepticism"

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that moral conciliationism entails epistemological moral scepticism. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that moral conciliationism saves us from epistemological moral scepticism. First, I show that only taking disagreements seriously as a threat to our beliefs allows us to utilise agreement to support these beliefs (call this symmetry). Next, I argue that utilising moral agreements as an epistemic resource allows moral conciliationism to resist the conclusion of epistemological moral scepticism. Following this defence of moral conciliationism, I argue that accepting moral conciliationism may indeed be necessary to resist epistemological moral scepticism. For this, I suggest that moral inquiry is best understood as a collective project. If so, then agreement on our moral judgments is required to justify the confidence we have in our moral beliefs. However, by symmetry, this appeal is possible only if one accepts the conciliatory attitude towards disagreements. Hence, accepting, rather than rejecting moral conciliationism, is the way out of epistemological moral scepticism. grue-like properties.
Abstract: Anti-realists about metaphysical modality hold that truths about metaphysical modality are reduced to truths about our minds or languages. The contingency problem says that since truths about our minds and languages are contingent, they cannot reduce truths about metaphysical modality, which are necessary. Anti-realists have proposed two responses to the contingency problem: reject the Iterability axiom or rigidify modal terms with respect to truths about our actual minds or languages. Although the second response is more popular among anti-realists as it does not challenge independently plausible modal principles, I argue that the first response should be preferred. I do so by identifying another general problem for anti-realists, ‘the KI problem,’ which can only be solved by either rejecting Iterability or the K axiom. Rejecting Iterability should be preferred to rigidification as it solves both the contingency problem and the KI problem, whereas rigidification only solves one.

Abstract: Shamik Dasgupta floats a view according to which acquaintables like sights, sounds, and smells are theory-guiding; phenomenal acquaintance with, say, the color green removes any question as to why green is theoretically privileged over grue. However, he raises a number of worries with this position. I argue that these worries can be defused and that the resultant view has interesting ontological consequences – for we are acquainted with ordinary objects. I close by considering, and then suggesting that we reject, the possibility of creatures who can become naturally acquainted with grue-like properties.