Justin Clarke-Doane

Justin Clarke-Doane

Research Interest

Associate Professor | Columbia University

2011 Ph.D. Philosophy, NYU
2005 B.A. Philosophy / Mathematics, New College of Florida

Justin Clarke-Doane joined the Columbia department in 2014.  He is also an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham, UK, an Adjunct Research Associate at Monash University, Australia, and has been Periodic Visitor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.  His work centers on metaphysical and epistemological problems surrounding apparently a priori, or 'armchair', inquiry, like mathematical, logical, moral and modal inquiry.  He is the author of Morality and Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 2020), Mathematics and Metaphilosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2022), and various articles.  The Philosopher's Annual twice selected his papers as among the "ten best in philosophy".  In addition to his primary areas of research, he has written on the mind-body problem, the philosophy of physics, and (with Kathryn Tabb) free will and psychopathology.

 

Selected Articles

Forthcoming "Précis" & "Reply to Critics" for an author-meets-critics symposium on Morality and Mathematics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (with commentary by Catarina Dutilh NovaesBrian Leiter, & Gideon Rosen).

Forthcoming "What is Logical Monism?," Paul Boghossian & Chris Peacocke (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Forthcoming (with Avner Ash), "Intuition and Observation," Carolin AntosNeil Barton, & Giorgio Venturi (eds.), Palgrave Companion to the Philosophy of Set Theory.  

Forthcoming (with William McCarthy) "Modal Pluralism and Higher-Order Logic," Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics (annual supplement to Noûs).

Forthcoming "Platonism, Nominalism, and Semantic Appearances,"  Logique et Analyse.

2022 (with Kathryn Tabb) "Addiction and Agency," Matt King & Josh May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorders: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2021 "Metaphysical and Absolute Possibility," Synthese (special issue on modal epistemology). Vol. 198. 1861-1872.

2020 "Set-Theoretic Pluralism and the Benacerraf Problem," Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177. 2013-2030.

2020 "Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology," Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology.  Routledge.

2019 "Modal Objectivity," Noûs. Vol. 53. 266-295.

2019 "Undermining Belief in Consciousness," for an author-meets-critics symposium on David Chalmers' "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness," with replies from Chalmers, Journal of Consciousness Studies. Vol. 26. 34-47.

2016 "What is the Benacerraf Problem?," Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity. Dordrecht: Springer.

2015  "Objectivity in Ethics and Mathematics,"  Ben Colburn (ed.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, The Virtual Issue.

2015 "Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality," Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 10.  New York: Oxford University Press.

2014 "Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy," Noûs. Vol. 48. 238-255. [Reprinted in Sarah Aronowitz, Patrick Grim, Zoe Johnson King, and Nicholas Serafin (eds.), Philosopher's Annual, Vol. 34.]

2013 "What is Absolute Undecidability?," Noûs. Vol. 47. 467-481.

2012 "Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge," Ethics. Vol. 122. 313-340. [Online Discussion at PEA Soup] [Reprinted in Patrick Grim, Chloe Armstrong, Patrick Shirreff and Nils-Hennes Stear (eds.), Philosopher's Annual, Vol. 32.]

 

Edited Volume

2012 Special issue of the Review of Symbolic Logic on objectivity and undecidability in mathematics.

Selected Publications

2020 Morality and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2022 Mathematics and Metaphilosophy (Cambridge Elements). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.